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 : case No. 19745 
FRED SCHWENDIMAN, Director : 
of Driver's License, State 
of Utah, 
Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case appellant seeks to have §41-2-19.6 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended) declared unconstitutional on its face 
and as applied; to find that the decision of the department of 
public safety Suspending his driver's license for being in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while driving under 
the influence of alcohol, was arbitrary arid capricious; and to 
hold that an aQquittal of the criminal charges against him, 
bars suspension of his driving privileges by the department of 
public safety. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The district court denied appellant's Petition for 
Reinstatement of Driver's License aftey the Department of 
Public Safety had suspended his license. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the trial court's decision 
reversed and for an order reinstating his driving privileges. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was arrested September 8, 1983, and charged 
with being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol. His driver's license was 
taken and he was issued a temporary license, good for 30 
days. (DUI citation R. 12) 
He timely requested a hearing before the Department 
of Public Safety, Office of Driver License Services 
(hereinafter referred to as "the department"). (Letter from 
McRae & DeLand, R. 12) He was notified of the hearing to be 
held September 28, 1983, by notice dated and mailed September 
23, 1983. (Letter from Office of Driver License Service dated 
September 23, 1983, R. 12) Appellant and counsel appeared at 
the time and place set for hearing, but no hearing examiner 
from the department was present. (TR. pgs. 19-20) 
Appellant was notified of another hearing by oral 
notification to his counsel (TR. 20) and a per se hearing was 
held before the department October 5, 1983. (TR. p. 30) 
The arresting officer was not present at the hearing, 
but the hearing examiner considered his notarized statement 
and the results of the breathalizer test contained in his 
statement. (TR. 16) In the officer's report he stated that 
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the appellant was sitting in the driver's seat, with the keys 
in the ignition and in the "on" position, knd that the vehicle 
was rolling backward. (R. 12, DUI Report Form) 
Appellant was present at the hearing with counsel. 
The hearing examiner summarized his testimony as follows: 
Driver testified that he was [sitting in a 
vehicle within the impound lot at G & L Motors 
of Roosevelt, Utah. He states that the vehicle 
was not running and that he was not going to go 
anywhere, but was waiting for his wife to come 
and pick him up to take him home. He states 
that the vehicle was not running, and not 
registered. (R.. 12 Facts and Findings) 
Prior to the hearing held October 5, appellant 
his drivers license 
of Suspension dated 
was informed at the 
received a Notice from the Department that 
was suspended for 90 days. (R. 12, Order| 
October 3, 1983) Counsel for appellant 
hearing that said notice of suspension vdas the final notice 
appellant would receive from the department:. (TR. 25) 
He timely petitioned the district court for an order 
reinstating his driving privileges, whictj petition was filed 
October 17, 1983. (R. 1-5) A hearing 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell on November 8, 1983, wherein appellant 
challenged the constitutionality of §41-^-19.6 U.C.A. on its 
face and as applied, and requested that 
the statute, it find the decision of tit 
arbitrary or capricious. Appellant's 
Exhibits 1 and 2, letters evidencing counsel's attempt to 
obtain subpoenas at hearings before the department and the 
was held before the 
if the court upheld 
)tie department to be 
counsel proffered 
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denial of their request. (TR. p. 22, lines 1-9) (TR p.29-30) 
(Copies of Exhibits 1 and 2 are attached hereto). His 
Petition was denied. (R. 13) Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order were signed by Judge Bunnell on 
November 21, 1983 and filed November 28, 1983 denying 
appellant's petition. (R. 21-23) 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed December 16, 
1983. (R. 27-28) 
He was found not guilty in his criminal trial held 
October 31, 1983. (Traffic Docket from Roosevelt Circuit 
Court and TR. 24) His driving privileges were reinstated on 
October 17, 1983, by the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, judge 
of the Seventh Judicial District Court, pending a hearing on 
his Petition (R. 6-7) and again after the denial of his 
petition, pending this appeal. (R. 16-17) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 41-2-19.6 U.C.A. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS 
FACE AND AS APPLIED AS VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND ARTICLE I, §7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Section 41-2-19.6 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) with an 
effective date of August 1, 1983, provides that when a peace 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person has 
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violated §41-6-44 U.C.A. (driving or being in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol) the officer shall take the Utahfs driverfs license 
and issue a temporary license effective fbr thirty days. If 
no action is taken by the driver his or her license is 
automatically suspended for ninety daysf with no provision for 
a restricted license to drive to and from work. If the 
arrested person requests a hearing within t;en days of the date 
of arrest, a hearing shall be held no later than thirty days 
from the date of arrest and issuance of the thirty day license. 
The statute further provides that: 
(5) The hearing shall be documented and its 
scope shall cover the issues of whether a peace 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
person to have been operating a motor vehicle 
in violation of Section 41-6-441 whether the 
person refused to submit to the test, and the 
test results, if any. In connection with a 
hearing the department . . . may administer 
oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of 
relevant books and papers. 
Section 41-2-20 U.C.A. allows a berson whose license 
has been suspended by the department to petition the district 
court for a hearing. The court's jurisdiciion is limited to a 
review of the record to determine whether or not the 
department's decision was arbitrary or capricious. 
The Utah legislature has attempted to set up a 
procedure whereby a driver is given the opportunity to have a 
hearing prior to the time his suspension bepomes final. 
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Appellant does not challenge the timing of the administrative 
hearing, but challenges the adequacy of the hearing 
Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's 
caser their continued possession may become 
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. 
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves 
state action that adjudicates important 
interests of the licensees. In such cases 
licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the 14th 
Amendment. (Citations omitted) This is but an 
application of the general proposition that 
relevant constitutional restraints limit state 
power to terminate an entitlement whether the 
entitlement is denominated a "right" or a 
"privilege". Bell v. Burson, 402 US, at 539, 
29 L.Ed2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (1971) 
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the 
issue of timing, and to what extent due process requires a 
presuspension hearing. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333, 
47 L.Ed2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976) applied a three step 
analysis which has been followed in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 
105, 52 L.Ed2d 172, 97 S.Ct. 1723 (1977) and Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 61 L.Ed2d 321, 99 S.Ct. 2612 (1979) as 
being applicable to statutes suspending a driver's license. 
In Dixon v. Love, supra, the court upheld a statute 
against constitutional challenges, which provided for an 
initial summary decision suspending the motorist's license 
based on official records that a driver had been convicted of 
three moving traffic violations within a twelve month period. 
As early as practicable after the suspension, and prior to the 
time it became final, a full evidenciary hearing was 
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available. The case presented an issue of timing of the 
hearing and not adequacy of the hearing. 
Also in Mackey v. Montrym, supra, the question raised 
was one of timing of the hearing, not adequacy. The court 
upheld a statute which allowed for suspension of a driver's 
license, based upon an officer's written report that the 
driver had refused to submit to a chemical test, without 
providing for a presuspension hearing. 'Jrhe court noted at 
page 333 the driver could obtain a prompt 
factual disputes. The court also noted at 
that the driver could adjourn the heading to permit the 
attendance of witnesses, who were then subject to 
cross-examination. 
hearing to resolve 
page 328 footnote 5 
Mackey v. Montrym, 
hearing in certain 
provided for prompt 
Ifinal suspension. 
Although Dixon v. Love, supra andl 
supra, have allowed suspensions prior to a 
circumstances, in both cases, the statutes 
and full evidenciary hearings prior to the 
The hearings held before the department are 
quasi-judicial in that the hearing examiner is empowered to 
investigate facts, weight evidence, draw conclusions, and 
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 
In speaking of the necessary administrative due 
process requirements in quasi-judicial hearings, the United 
States Supreme Court has held: 
All parties must be fully appraised of the 
evidence submitted or to be considered and must 
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be given opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer 
evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no 
other way can a party maintain its right or 
make its defense* In no other way can it test 
the sufficiency of the facts to support the 
findings • . . ICC v. Louisville & Nashville 
R.R. Co,f 227 U.S. 88 (1913) 
Bell v. Burson, supra is most applicable in this case 
as it addressed the adequacy of the hearing, rather than 
dealing with the issue of suspension prior to a hearing being 
afforded. The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must 
be "meaningful" and "appropriate to the nature of the case." 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that the 
"right to drive is a valuable right or privilege and it cannot 
be taken away without procedural due process." Ballard v. 
State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979). 
In various state court cases, where the issue of 
sufficiency of the hearing has been raised, it is generally 
held that the driver has the right to cross-examine witnesses 
and to confront his accusers at the hearing. See 60 ALR3d 427 
License Revocation - Sufficiency of Hearing §5 and cases cited 
therein where courts have held that hearings based solely upon 
officers1 written reports, violated the driver's right to be 
confronted by his accusers and right to cross examination. In 
Re Sweeney, 257 A2d 764 (Del. 1969) The statute providing for 
a hearing meant a "fair" hearing and suspension was vacated 
because officer did not appear at hearing. In Application of 
Goodwin, 173 Misc 169, 17 NYS2d 426 (1940), substantial rights 
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of the motorist were violated where th^ affidavit of the 
police officer was received and the driver had no chance to be 
confronted by his accuser. 
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court, Utah 
Supreme Court and courts from numerous 
have all held that due process requires a 
and this in turn requires that a person be allowed the 
opportunity to confront his accusers, to 
and to be empowered to subpoena other witne 
Appellant's license was revoked 
soley upon the notarized report of an o 
present. The right to cross-examination 
cross-examine them, 
sses on his behalf. 
by the department 
fficer who was not 
is vital to insure 
that procedural requirements set forth in ^tatute and case law 
are complied with, in additional to ascertaining the truth. 
Two examples come to mind: The Utah statute requires that the 
hearing be conducted upon the "sworn" repprt of the officer. 
§41-2-19.6(4) U. C. A. Appellant had 
question the officer as to whether or not 
an affirmative act of swearing at the timd in compliance with 
the recent case of Colman v. Schwendimaij, No. 18652 (Filed 
Feb. 29, 1984 Utah). There was no evidence he was qualified 
to operate the breathalizer machine, or tnat he complied with 
the other standards set forth in State vj Baker, 56 Wash.2d 
846, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (1960). 
other jurisdictions 
"meaningful" hearing 
no opportunity to 
he did in fact make 
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Although the state should have the burden of 
producing the officer, even if a driver wanted to subpoena the 
officer, or any other witness on his behalf, department policy 
has been to deny drivers any subpoenas unless they first 
request the subpoenas in writing and state the anticipated 
testimony. (Proffered Exhibits 1 and 2) Given the time 
limitations in these hearings, which is often less than five 
daysf it is impossible for drivers to request the subpoenas in 
writing and obtain them prior to the hearings and get them 
served. 
The statute only requires that the examiner "may" 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, not that he 
"must" issue them at the driver's request. In Beatty v. 
Hults, 22 App.Div.2d 740, 253 NYS2d 327 (NY 1964) the driver's 
license suspension was reversed for failure of the examiner to 
issue requested subpoenas. 
Also, the statute does not provide what prior notice 
of the hearing, if any, must be given the motorists. In this 
case notice of a hearing to be held September 28 was dated and 
mailed September 23. September 23, 1983, was a Friday. 
Allowing three working days for mail delivery this would be 
one day prior notice of the hearing. Although not binding on 
administration agencies, Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure require five days prior notice of hearings on 
motions, excluding weekends and holidays, and allowing for 
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three days for service by mail. It is questionable whether 
one day prior notice in appellant's case is adequate under the 
due process requirements. The statute on its face is silent 
as to what prior notice is sufficient and cpould - be interpreted 
to allow for even one hours notice. Due process is an 
opportunity to be heard and "it is an opportunity which must 
be granted to a meaningful time and in a Meaningful manner." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 
1187 (1965) 
The statute is unconstitutional on its face in that 
the hearing is conducted solely upon the J sworn report of an 
absent officers; it does not mandate that the hearing examiner 
L.Ed2d 62, 85 S.Ct. 
provide the motorists with subpoenas; and 
what prior notice be given the motorist ol 
For the same reasons, it is unconstitutional as applied in 
this case in that the officer did not kppear; counsel for 
appellant had previously been denied subpoenas unless first 
requesting them in writing and given the time limitations 
(notice mailed on the 23rd for hearing to be held on the 28th) 
an attempt to request subpoenas would have peen futile. 
POINT II 
THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
it is silent as to 
f the hearing date. 
The department's decision was 
hearsay evidence, inasmuch as the officer did not appear at 
the hearing, but submitted his sworn report 
based totally on 
which contained 
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the results of the breathalizer test and several statements as 
to why he believed appellant was in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle. 
The department has determined that "The hearing 
officer shall not be bound by formal rules of evidence or 
procedure in administration of this hearing but shall consider 
all relevant evidence.w (R.l - Opening Statement of Hearing 
Examiner) 
Although hearsay evidence is generally admissible 
within the State of Utah, in administrative proceedings, it is 
well established that the administrative hearing officer 
cannot base his findings wholly upon hearsay evidence. 
In workman's compensation cases before the Industrial 
Commission, it has been determined that there must be at least 
a residuum of evidence to support the administrative hearing 
that would be competent in a court of law. Hackford v. 
Industrial Commmission, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899 (Utah 
1961). 
This principal is likewise applicable in hearings 
before the bank commissioner. 
[T]his court has held that hearsay evidence is 
admissible before the Industrial Commission and 
the Public Service Commission. However, a 
finding of fact cannot be based solely upon 
hearsay evidence, but must be "supported by a 
residuum of legally competent evidence in a 
court of law." No sound reason appears why the 
same rule should not be applicable to 
proceedings before the bank commissioner. 
Sandy Bank v. Brimhal, 636 Pl2d 481 (Utah 1981) 
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The "legal residuum rule" is firmly established in 
Utah and widely recognized in jurisdictions throughout this 
country and in general works of law. See 
Note - Hearsay Evidence in Proceed!] 
36 ALR3d 12, Comment 
ings Before State 
Administrative Agencies, 1971. Also se^ 2 AmJur2d 577-581 
Administrative Law, Section 691. That rule requires some 
residuum of evidence admissible in a court of law. 
Clearly the breathalizer test results are not 
admissible unless certain foundational requirements are met, 
none of which were present at appellant's hearing. Murray 
City v. Hall, No. 17329, (Filed April ]L3, 1983, Utah) and 
State v. Baker, supra. 
Police reports containing matter^ observed by police 
officers are not admissible at a defendant's criminal trial. 
Rule 803 (8) (B) Utah Rules of Evidence. 
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) 
There was no "legal residuum" of evidence to support 
the administrative finding that the officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe appellant to have beeih in actual physical 
control of a vehicle and had a blood alcphol content of .08% 
or greater. Therefore the decision was arbitrary or 
capricious. 
In Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 462 P. 2d 139 (N.Mex. 
1969) it was held that an administrative finding based solely 
on hearsay does not rise to the level of substantial evidence 
ptate v. Bertul, 644 
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and hence, is an arbitrary and capricious action. 
Appellant was not afforded a "meaningful" hearing 
that complied with due process (Point I)f nor was any evidence 
legally competent in a court of law offered against him, and 
therefore the department's decision was arbitrary or 
capricious. 
POINT III 
ACQUITTAL BY THE COURT OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES BARS 
SUSPENSION OF APPELLANT'S LICENSE. 
As a general rule, acquittal on a criminal charge is 
not a bar to subsequent civil action arising out of the same 
facts on which the criminal proceeding was held. Criminal 
charges require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas proof 
in civil actions and administrative hearings is of a lesser 
degree. See 96 ALR2d §612 which dealt with various state 
court decision. 
However, Mackey v. Montrym, supra, at 328 seems to 
support the proposition that a finding by a court is binding 
on the administrative agency. Montyrm received notice his 
license was suspended for failure to take a breath-analysis 
test. Rather than obtaining an immediate hearing before the 
Registrar, he took an appeal to the Board of Appeal. Prior to 
the time the Board of Appeal was to conduct a hearing, 
Montrym1s counsel made demand upon the Registrar for return of 
his license, and stated in the letter that he had been 
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acquitted of the driving under the influence charge, and 
asserted that the state court's finding that the officer had 
refused to administer the test was binding on the Registrar. 
The court sated: 
Had Montrym's counsel enclosed d copy of the 
order dismissing the drunk-driving charge, the 
entire matter might well have be^n disposed of 
at that state without more. 
In analyzing the issue of tlfie necessity of a 
i 
presuspension hearing, the court reasoned at page 332 the 
issue reaised by Montrym was not a "factual11 one but rather a 
legal question; that is whether the court's subsequent 
finding that the police later refused to administer the test 
was binding on the Registrar as a njatter of collateral 
estoppel. 
The issue of collateral estoppel was not directly 
dealt with in Montrym, as the issue was {not raised on appeal, 
but in the court's analysis of the case it intimated had 
I 
• 
counsel properly submitted the order dismissing the criminal 
charge to the Registrar, the matter may have been disposed of. 
In appellant's case prior to hearing on his petition 
before the district court he was acquitted of the criminal 
charges. However, the trial judge refusjed to find it a bar to 
his suspension. 
The factual issues were exactly the same in the 
j 
department's hearing and in the district court, and no 
specific intent was involved in the criminal case. 
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The acquittal indicates appellant is not a safety 
hazard and therefore the purpose of §41-2-19.5 U.C.A. for 
suspension of licenses has not been fully complied with. 
CONCLUSION 
A hearing based upon the notarized report of an 
officer is not a "meaningful11 hearing and denies motorists 
their constitutional rights to confront their accusers and 
cross-examine them. The department's policy of not allowing a 
driver's access to subpoenas is also a flagrant violation of 
constitutional rights. 
The hearsay report of the officer and improperly 
considered breathalizer result do not comply with the 'legal 
residuum' rule followed in Utah, and standing alone or 
consided with the constitutional violations, make the decision 
of the department arbitrary or capricious. 
The court's acquittal of the crimial charges should 
be binding on the department. 
Motorists often depend on the ability to drive for 
their livelihood and this property right is constitutionally 
directed. The enactment of §41-2-19.6 U.C.A. manifests an 
intent by the Legislature to relieve the State of Utah of the 
inconvenience of calling the officer at every hearing before 
the department. However, expediency must be limited by 
constitutional protections. The most expedient hearing would 
be no hearing at all. 
-16-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th diy of August, 1984. 
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McRAE 8 D E L A N D 
A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW 
ROBERT M. MCRAE 
LONI F! DELAND 
JOANN B. STRINGHAM 
L. A. DEVER 
72 EAST FOURTH SOUTH. SUITE 355 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE leOl) 36A- I333 
HALLS CROSSING. UTAH 
TELEPHONE (6011 78B-2H5 EXTENSION Hl| 
ASHTON ENERGY CENTER 
teSO WEST HIGHWAY AO. SUITE I ISO 
VERNAL. UTAH 84078 
TELEPHONE (SOU 789 -1666 
July 15, 1983 
Mr. Phil Himmelberger 
Driver License Services 
Third Floor South 
2501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
Dear Phil: 
Several weeks ago I asked you to 
supply of blank issued driver's license d 
as contemplated by your statutory authority 
Please do so immediately. 
forward to me a 
epprtment subpoenas 
to issue subpoenas, 
a copy of the 
to driver's license 
I also request again at this time 
department rules and regulations pertaining 
matters including, but not limited to, postj-arrest hearings 
and refusal hearings which will be held under House Bill #142, 
which I believe is the correct designation pf the new DUI law 
which takes effect August 1, 1983. 
Sincerely, 
Robert M. McRae 
RMMrpm 
- CtefcM Court 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
July 22, 1983 
ROBERT M. MCRAE 
McRae & DeLand 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 355 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Administrative Subpoenas 
Dear Bob: 
Your telephone conversation and letter to Phil 
Himmelberger regarding the above have been referred to 
me for response. Please be advised that under my advice, 
it is departmental policy to issue subpoenas only in cases 
where good cause that is relevant is given to the central 
office in writing. If you will provide the same in a 
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the proper statutory 
send you one of 
The Department rules and regulations have not been 
implemented yet because they have not had experience with 
the matter. That will be done pursuant to 
authority and as soon as it is done we will| 
the first copies. 
Sincerely, 
BRUCE M. HALEl 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax and Business Regulation Div, 
BMH/vlw 
c c ; P h i l Himmelberger 
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